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ABSTRACT 
Recent cyber-attacks on supply chains such as the large-scale SolarWinds attack 
are gaining the attention of cybersecurity experts. Supply chain attacks are growing in 
frequency and are taking advantage of the trust that organizations put in the 
dependencies of their supply. The machine learning supply chain is incredibly vulnerable 
to this category of attack because of the large number of dependencies utilized. We 
demonstrate a weakness in a machine learning supply chain by attacking the model’s 
parameters. We then demonstrate how an organization can implement secure 
checkpoints that generate integrity metadata and detect this class of attack before 
proceeding to the next phase in the supply chain. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Recent cyber-attack such as the large-scale SolarWinds attack are gaining the 
attention of cybersecurity experts [1]. The SolarWinds attack, which affected over 100 
large organizations, is an example of a supply chain attack [1]. A supply chain attack 
involves an adversary manipulating the dependencies of a deliverable, for example by 
inserting malicious code or new malicious components [2]. Cybersecurity experts are 
seeing an incredible increase in frequency of supply chain attacks [3]. These attacks take 
advantage of an organization’s trust in software, hardware, or vendor [4]. Because of its 
large and growing dependency on tools and third-party platforms and lack of sufficient 
industry security standards, machine learning supply chains are incredibly vulnerable to 
attack [5]. The ability to identify the architecture of the model [6], [7], poison training data 
[8], craft malicious input [9], and more recently altering the parameters of the model itself 
[10], [11], are all techniques an attacker can use to help compromise a machine learning 
supply chain. 
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate a mitigation technique to one type of 
machine learning supply chain attacks using standard cybersecurity principles instead of 
overly complicated machine learning solutions. Because of the large attack surface of 
supply chains [12], analyzing every component and dependency in a supply chain would 
be a tedious and large undertaking. Additionally, when attempting to secure the identified 
component or dependency, we can never be 100% confident that the code we depend on 
has not been modified. This inability to achieve 100% confidence in the code is an example 
of the Halting problem [13], [14]. Because of this lack of confidence, when implementing 
security within a supply chain, we need a design with possible failure in mind and the 
ability to identify and locate that failure. Because each component is an application-specific 
endeavor, this thesis focuses on methods of identifying and locating compromises within 
the machine learning supply chain before they spread to dependent components. We 
achieve this through security controls in strategic points of the machine learning supply 
chain. These security controls generate integrity metadata and act as gate keepers between 
xv 
xvi 
phases of the supply chains preventing the spread of compromises. A possible 
implementation of checkpoints is seen in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Static Machine Learning Product Life cycle with Security Controls. 
Source: [15] 
To demonstrate the usefulness of this defense technique, we create our own 
machine learning application with its own supply chain. We simulate an attacker’s ability 
to attack a machine learning model’s integrity by accessing the saved location of our model 
and then perturbing the weights of the model.  
After demonstrating the possibility of this attack and its potential damage, we 
design a security control. When constructing our security control, we wrap the standard 
TensorFlow checkpoint API calls to make a new custom checkpoint which generates and 
saves integrity metadata. This is simple and elegant. It can detect our attack and other 
attacks on model parameters. Because our checkpoint utilizes cryptographically secure 
hashes and hashes give fixed-size outputs and cryptographically secure hash functions have 
preimage and second preimage resistance, verification of the integrity metadata will fail in 
the same way if one parameter is changed or if every parameter of the model is changed  
xvii 
Our experiment demonstrates the vulnerability of our machine learning application 
to supply chain attacks. It also demonstrates how secure controls are a viable method of 
mitigating these attacks. Because our checkpoint utilizes hashes that show tampering 
regardless of the extent of supply-chain alterations, we are able to detect attack every time. 
This is not the only way to achieve integrity in a machine learning supply chain, but our 
technique is much simpler and cost effective than previously proposed machine learning 
techniques [16]-[19]. Future areas of research include methods to detect supply chain 
attacks on online machine learning applications and the usefulness of Merkle trees in 
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In late 2020, while the world was focused on the global Covid-19 pandemic, 
another pandemic, a cyber-pandemic, was discovered in America. SolarWinds, a software 
company based out of Texas, had been in business for over twenty years. They specialize 
in network monitoring and system management. Because of their great reputation, over 
one-hundred private companies and several federal agencies have relied on their services. 
Their client list included household names such as Microsoft, Intel, CISCO, the 
Department of Justice, and the Department of the Treasury. Like any software company, 
SolarWinds routinely updated software and sent security patches, and their trusting clients 
implemented these updates. As early as 2019, the Orion software developed by SolarWinds 
was infected by a sophisticated and well-funded hacker organization [1]. This hacker group 
embedded malware into one of the routine software patches sent out by SolarWinds [1]. 
The trusting clients implemented this software update and unknowingly were 
compromised. Because of the large number of SolarWinds’ clients, the hacker group was 
able to infect an incredibly large number of organizations. This attack, commonly 
attributed to Russia, received an enormous amount of media coverage and caught the 
attention of the cyber-security community. The SolarWinds attack is interesting to the 
security community not necessarily because of the malware itself, but because of how it 
was delivered to the victims. The clients, many of whom had extensive security measures 
within their organization, were compromised not because of their own lack of security but 
because of their trust in software created outside their organization. The clients of 
SolarWinds were the victims of what is known as a supply chain attack [1].  
A. PROBLEM 
A supply chain attack is “a technique in which an adversary slips malicious code or 
even a malicious component into a trusted piece of software or hardware” [2]. The 
underlying vulnerability exploited by supply chain attacks is trust. When an organization 
utilizes tools, software, and hardware they have not created, they are implicitly trusting in 
the security of what is being used. Ken Thompson in his Turing Award Speech highlights 
2 
how trust can lead to vulnerabilities that are incredibly difficult to detect [3]. When an 
organization develops software, it must realize their place in the supply chain. The 
organization is part of a bigger process which includes vendors, tool developers, 
infrastructure support, and many other components. As the cyber-realm becomes more 
complex and dependent on third-party software and platforms, organizations are expanding 
the number of components in the chain and by extension their circle of trust and increasing 
their vulnerability to supply chain attacks.  
Because of its large and growing dependency on tools and third-party platforms 
and lack of sufficient industry security standards [4], machine learning is incredibly 
vulnerable to supply chain attacks. Attackers have the ability to identify the architecture of 
the model [5], [6], poison training data [7], craft malicious input [8], and more recently, to 
alter the parameters of the model itself [9]–[11]. 
B. CONTRIBUTION 
In this thesis, we build a basic machine learning application using standard tools 
and procedures. We then demonstrate its vulnerability to a supply chain attack. After 
demonstrating this vulnerability, we present a simple mitigation technique using standard 
cyber-security principles and procedures. 
The principles of supply chains and their security, which we will identify in 
Chapters  II and III, can be applied to all software development, but the scope of our 
experiment is limited to a subset of software development, machine learning. Within 
machine learning, the scope of our experiment is limited to static models trained on third-
party platforms such as Colab or Amazon Web Services (AWS). Additionally, a major 
consideration in the selection of our experiment’s methodology is simplicity. There are 
many complicated machine learning solutions that can address vulnerabilities in the 
machine learning supply chain [12]–[14], but we believe these complicated solutions are 
not entirely necessary. Any time complexity is added to a system, unexpected emergent 
behaviors are likely to occur [15]. The goal of our experiment is to demonstrate a possible 
mitigation technique to a specific machine learning supply chain attacks using standard 
cybersecurity principles instead of overly complicated machine learning solutions.  
3 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The rest of this thesis is divided into four chapters. In Chapter  II, “Understanding 
Supply Chains,” we take an in depth look at supply chains. In Chapter III, “Security Within 
the Supply Chain,” we will look at different security concerns within the supply chain. 
Chapter IV, “Demonstrating Supply Chain Risks and Mitigation,” details our 
demonstration of attacking and defending our machine learning application. We conclude 
our thesis and provide recommendations for future research in Chapter V, “Conclusion.” 
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II. UNDERSTANDING SUPPLY CHAINS 
Before we can defend supply chains, we need to define and understand them. We 
define a supply chain as anything that affects production of a given product. That definition 
is intentionally broad. The rest of Chapter II will be spent classifying supply chains, 
identifying components within a supply chain, and understanding the machine learning 
supply chain.  
A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUPPLY CHAINS 
There are two broad and non-mutually exclusive categories of supply chains: 
efficient and responsive [16], [17]. In industries where goods are easily substituted between 
producers, cost is the biggest differentiator for consumers, resulting in heavy emphasis on 
efficiency in their supply chain management. A good example of this would be the paper 
industry. When the average customer goes to the store to buy copier paper, they do not 
have an emotional attachment or even a preference for the International Paper company or 
Stora Enso company, they are primarily examining the cost difference between virtually 
indistinguishable products. We are not aware of any software developer that implements 
this type of supply chain, because of the general high specificity and sometimes limited 
substitutability of software [18].  
The second broad category of supply chains is the responsive supply chain model. 
Whereas the focus of the efficient supply chain is efficiency, responsive supply chains are 
primarily concerned with their ability to quickly adapt to the changing needs of their 
clients. Industries more likely to use responsive supply chain models include the tech 
industries, marketing, and construction. Within this category are three non-mutually 
exclusive subcategories of supply chain models: flexible, custom-configured, and agile 
[19]. These categories and subcategories more closely resemble principles and primary 
goals than actual rules and specific procedures.  
We focus here on agile supply chains, as they are often used in the software 
development industry [20]. This subcategory of supply chains does not start production 
before receiving customer specifications, so it is well suited to industries with 
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unpredictable demand. Software developers often achieve agility in their supply chains 
through the use of iterative development methodologies that derive and operationalize 
requirements during the development process [20]. Because it is of relevance to the 
development of modern machine-learning-based systems, we will only focus on the Agile 
software development methodology. 
The concept of Agile software development was first popularized by the Manifesto 
for Agile Software Development, written by a group of developers in a resort located at 
Snowbird, Utah in 2001. The authors identified four principles for accomplishing this, 
valuing “individuals and interactions over processes and tools”; having “working software 
over comprehensive documentation”; encouraging “customer collaboration over contract 
negotiation”;  and “responding to change over following a plan” [21]. Operationalizing 
these principles tends to force cyclical management of the supply chain. Figure 1 is a high-
level representation of software developers’ use of the Agile model.  
 
Figure 1. High-level View of the Agile Software Development Life Cycle. 
Sources: [22], [23]. 
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Developers take input from customers throughout the development life cycle. 
Initial input is used to plan the project, provide early technical analysis of requirements, 
and reach a minimal viable product, while later input is used to build iteratively upon the 
existing product. In the implementation phase, coders turn the plans and analysis into code. 
As the product is developed, it is also tested for conformance to the customer’s 
requirements. Testing can include functional testing, acceptance testing, or examining 
nonfunctional requirements [24], [25]. Testing and development may iterate until 
requirements are met satisfactorily. When the testing requirements are satisfied, the product 
enters an operational phase. During this phase, technical support of the application is either 
implemented or planned, which may reveal new requirements or revisions to existing 
requirements to be fed back into the beginning of the cycle. Cycles are meant to be 
completed quickly, to limit time wasted developing a product the customer is not happy 
with. On larger scale projects, separate components may be developed using the Agile 




Figure 2. Agile Implementation in Larger Projects, with Multiple 
Components. Sources: [22], [23], [26]. 
B. DEFINING SOFTWARE SUPPLY CHAINS 
Our discussion so far has dealt with principles of supply chains and the 
methodology of their management. However, even so informed, our understanding of 
supply chains for software is incomplete. We categorize software supply chains into four 
phases, outlined by the Agile model described above: development, testing of previously 
specified requirements, deployment, and support. These phases and their relationship to 
each other are shown in Figure 3. The development phase includes customer input, 
planning, analysis, and implementation. The testing phase is where testing and 
implementation of the product is conducted. Deployment is when the product is delivered 
to the customer. Information technology support, software patches, etc., happen in the 
support phase. 
9 
In addition to categorizing phases of the software supply chain for clarity, we 
consider the dependencies of each phase. We define dependencies of each life cycle phase 
to include any software, hardware, and personnel needed to accomplish the task associated 
with one of the phases. Dependencies under consideration vary from phase to phase and 
from product to product. Dependencies of every phase of the life cycle comprise the 
dependencies of the product overall. Any software that is used in the process would be a 
dependency. This would include the operating systems of the computers being used by the 
software developers, the assembler and complier used by the programmers, the platform 
the application is deployed to, and the tools used for testing the software. Hardware that 
could be considered a dependency would be the computers used by developers or onto 
which the software is deployed, and any physical infrastructure related to the project 
(datacenter racks, power distribution equipment, and computer networks). Personnel 
dependencies include employees of the developer as well as employees of its vendors and 
outside contractors. This includes employees involved during deployment, including those 





Figure 3. Software Supply Chain. Sources: [22], [23]. 
A deeper dive reveals that each of the identified dependencies has its own supply 
chain and dependencies. A change in the dependencies of dependencies of a product’s 
supply chain may directly or indirectly affect the supply chain itself. To be precise: a supply 
chain is dependent on the closure of its dependences. This relationship between a supply 
chain and its dependencies underscores the question of trust in software development. By 
taking on a dependency within a software product’s supply chain, we are trusting that 
dependency (and the closure of its dependencies). An additional consideration worth noting 
is the cyclical nature of software’s supply chain management with regard to dependencies: 
a change in a dependency in one phase will eventually affect the rest of the supply chain.  
C. MACHINE LEARNING SUPPLY CHAIN 
There is not an accepted standard for the life cycle of a machine learning product. 
Figure 4 is a generic abstraction of a machine learning product life cycle.  
11 
  
Figure 4. An Abstract Machine Learning Product Life Cycle. Source: [27]. 
The first phase in developing a machine learning product is data collection. Data 
collection includes acquiring, cleaning, and labeling data. Data collected will vary depending 
upon the specific application. For example, a machine learning application designed for 
distinguishing handwritten numerals would often require large numbers of images with 
handwritten numerals and the necessary formatting of data to be compatible with the input 
layer of the model. Data collected are often split into training data, validation data, and testing 
data. Training and validation data are used during the training phase, and testing data is used 
during the testing phase. Data collection is a very important phase because the quantity and 
quality of data has a significant impact on the performance of the model.  
In the training phase, the model is trained using the training and validation datasets 
from the data collection phase; and in the testing phase, the model is tested on the testing 
dataset which is often intended to be disjoint from the training data.  
The workflow described above is linear because it is not an online model. As stated 
previously, our experiment does not involve online models, so we mention them briefly 
only for completeness. In Chapter IV, we expound upon the importance of this distinction. 
An online model depends on a continuous supply of new data, feeding back data seen 
during the deployment phase as newly collected data. In an online model, developers train 
an initial model similarly to a traditional model. But upon deployment, the parameters of 
the model continuously change with the incoming feedback from new data. The life cycle 
of an online model resembles Figure 5.  
12 
 
Figure 5. An Abstract Machine Learning Product Life Cycle. Source: [27]. 
As mentioned previously, a representation of a supply chain that does not include 
dependencies is not complete. A more fully developed representation of the product life 
cycle of a traditional machine learning application is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. An Abstract Machine Learning Product Life Cycle. Source: [27]. 
Specific dependencies vary from application to application, but we highlight the 
most common, focusing on our chosen setting of developing and deploying a machine 
learning model on a third-party platform. In data collection, there are several dependencies: 
the provider of the data, labeling of data, cleaning of data, and the storage and retrieval of 
13 
the data. Providers of data can be the developers themselves, organizations such as National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) database, or companies that sell data to 
developers. Often the labeling and cleaning of data is also outsourced to different 
organizations. How data is retrieved from the provider and then stored is also a dependency 
that affects the data collection phase. In the next chapter, we examine how these 
dependencies can be exploited by malicious actors.  
In the training phase, the model is trained using the training and validation datasets 
from the data collection phase; and in the testing phase, the model is tested on the testing 
dataset, which is often intended to be disjoint from the training data. Dependencies within 
the training phase and testing include but are not limited to the software and hardware being 
used to train the model, the platform the model is being trained on, employees or 
contractors working on the project, and tools and data used to test the model. Training 
machine learning applications is computationally expensive, leading many developers to 
train, test, and deploy machine learning models on third-party platforms such as AWS.  
In the deployment phase, dependencies include the platform hosting the deployed 
product, which may or may not be the same platform as the development platform. 
Additional dependencies would include hardware such as the physical server storing the 
model [6]. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have laid the groundwork for a discussion of security within the 
supply chain, specifically machine learning supply chains. In Chapter III, we will examine 
the security implications of our discussion of supply chains. Before moving to next chapter, 
it is important to remember the key points of this chapter: a supply chain is dependent upon 
the closure of its dependencies, the cyclical nature of software supply chain management 
will propagate changes from one phase to the rest of the supply chain, and the machine 
learning supply chain has an abundance of dependencies.  
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III. SECURITY WITHIN THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
Before we can discuss security within the supply chain, we need a high-level 
understanding of relevant cyber-security concepts. Traditionally, cyber-security 
discussions have revolved around the “CIA Triad” [28]. The CIA Triad is a common 
representation of three important concerns within cybersecurity: confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability. Confidentiality, “a concept that applies to data that must be held in 
confidence and that describes the status and degree of protection that must be provided for 
such data about individuals as well as organizations” [29], was popularized as a concern in 
Hofferberts’ study for the Air Force in 1976 [30]. Discussions of confidentiality include 
topics such as encryption and access control. Discussions of integrity, the concept “which 
ensures that computer resources operate correctly and that data in the databases is correct” 
[29], include topics such as hashes, user verification, and checkpoints. Some of the early 
contributors to the idea of integrity within cybersecurity were Clark and Wilson at the 1987 
IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy [31], and Biba in 1977 [32]. It is 
difficult to pinpoint the idea of availability to a single author. The cybersecurity dictionary 
Data and Computer Security defines availability as “the characteristic that ensures the 
computer resources will be available to authorized users when they need them” [29]. 
Availability is primarily concerned with failure of the system. Confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability are all connected concepts within the CIA Triad. The common 
representation of the relationship between these concepts is shown in the depiction of the 




Figure 7. CIA Triad. Source: [33]. 
Supply chain attacks can attack the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a 
supply chain. As we will see later, preventing the spread of compromises within the supply 
chain primarily deals primarily with integrity. An additional cybersecurity concept related 
to our discussion is a trusted computing base (TCB), which is defined as “the totality of 
protection mechanisms within a computer system—including hardware, firmware and 
software” [34].  
A. SECURITY TECHNIQUES 
In the previous chapter, we discussed how a change in any component of the supply 
chain influences the rest of the supply chain. A secure supply chain requires security 
measures at every stage of the supply chain [35]. Because of the number of components 
and the number of dependencies in a supply chain, the potential attack surface is large [36]. 
The first step in securing the supply chain is to identify the attack surface. This can be done 
be identifying the various components and dependencies of the application. A quick look 
at even a simple supply chain will reveal many components and dependencies. In Figure 
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6, we identified four phases and their dependencies in the abstracted machine learning 
supply chain. Common components and dependencies within these four categories include 
operating systems in use, software in use, contractors, vendors, platforms, and many other 
items. 
Analyzing every one of these component and dependency, as in a Software Bill of 
Materials (SBOM), would be a tedious and large undertaking. Additionally, attempting to 
completely secure every identified component or dependency, as is the approach of the 
National Security Agencies’ (NSA) Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TSEC) 
[37], does not provide complete confidence in the integrity of the analyzed code. This 
inability to achieve 100% confidence in the code is an example of the Halting problem 
[38], [39]. We can never be 100% sure that every component or dependency is perfectly 
secure. Because of this inability, when implementing security within a supply chain, we 
need a design with possible failure in mind and the ability to identify and locate that failure. 
Because of the application specificity of securing each component, the rest of this chapter 
will focus on methods of identifying and locating compromises within the supply chain 
before proceeding to the next phase.  
One way to locate compromises within a supply chain is to add boundaries between 
phases within the supply chain. A visual representation of this can be seen in Figure 8. By 
strategically implementing security control, we can isolate the vulnerability. Possible 
security controls include items such as vendor questionnaires, code reviews, checksums, 
and cryptographic hash functions. These techniques are useful to our discussion, so we 





Figure 8. An Abstract Machine Learning Product Life Cycle with Security 
Controls and Dependencies. Source: [22], [23]. 
Vendor questionnaires are simple high-level security controls. Before using 
software from a vendor, a good practice is to require a vendor fill out a questionnaire 
detailing the specifics of the program. What questions are included in the questionnaire is 
up to the individual organization, but examples could include supported operating systems, 
delivery method of updates, libraries being used, etc.  The government has less flexibility 
in these crafting questionnaires and the questionnaires are governed by various government 
standards such as the Risk Management Framework (RMF) from the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). Upon completion, the organization decides if the risk 
of trusting the software outweighs the benefits of the software. While vendor 
questionnaires are good practice, they have underlying limitations [40]. 
Even the most well-intentioned vendor is sometimes hesitant to give detailed 
information on proprietary software. However, the government does get the source code 
for any software it orders from the developer for projects it solely funds under the 
guidelines of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), but possession of the 
source code in of itself does not ensure complete security of the code. An additional 
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security measure is third-party code reviews, which can be used as an alternative and or 
supplement to vendor questionnaires.  
Vendors or customers occasionally hire third-party organizations to do code 
reviews of their products. Third-party organizations should not have a conflict of interest 
and so should present an impartial judgment on the product. Third parties as a security 
control are not foolproof, and they are expensive, but they are useful [40]. An additional 
layer of protection would be for the organization itself to examine the software before 
implementing it into their supply chain. Once again, this technique is not foolproof or 
without limitations. Many software programs are not open source, and it is expensive to 
conduct an extensive code review.  
So far, the techniques discussed are high-level techniques. On the technical level, 
there are several techniques for verifying communication, users, and software identity (see, 
for example, approaches such as those in [41]–[43]). A simple technique that can be helpful 
are hashes. A hash is a function from an input domain, such as bytes, to a fixed-sized 
identifiers. In layman’s terms, a hash is like a “fingerprint” for software. Any change in 
software will result in a different hash, regardless of the size of the change. Because hashes 
are statistically impervious to the size of the change, they can be very useful as a checkpoint 
when verifying that the software being used is the actual software provided by the already 
vetted vendor.  
While none of these techniques is foolproof, adding secure checkpoints at strategic 
points in the supply chain will significantly increase chances of detecting compromises 
before proceeding to the rest of the supply chain. Up to this point, our discussion has been 
purposefully general. The goal of this thesis is to expound upon the security of machine 
learning supply chains. The rest of this chapter will look at ways to implement these 
strategic and secure checkpoints within a machine learning supply chain.  
B. MACHINE LEARNING SUPPLY CHAIN 
As discussed in Chapter II, there are four phases within the static machine learning 
workflow: data collection, training, testing, and deployment. The first step in hardening the 
supply chain is to identify the possible dependencies of a deliverable. We enumerate the 
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most common possibilities for each development phase. In Table 1, we list some of the 
common dependencies for data collection.  
Table 1. Data Collection Dependencies 
Hardware Software Personnel Infrastructure 
Data Storage Software tools Organization 
responsible for 
collecting, cleaning, 










Data collection is very important to the performance of the model. Ensuring the 
integrity and confidentiality of data is perhaps the most important ongoing activity. 
Malicious actors with access to data have the ability to poison the data, creating a 
compromised model [7]. A simple control point would involve examining the reputation 
of the outside parties, if any, responsible for collection, labeling, and cleaning of the data. 
Additionally, encrypting data could provide some added protection against confidentiality 
attacks.  
Once data is securely collected, a security control, between the data collection 
phase and the training phase is needed. This security control should verify the data 
collected has not been altered, before continuing to the training phase. This added check 
helps mitigate the risk of potential data poisoning.  
Within the training phase, are several dependencies. Training of machine learning 
models can be very computationally expensive. Because of this, many developers utilize 
third-party platforms such as AWS. It is important to realize that by using a third-party 
platform an organization is trusting the security of that third party. We want to know that 
the model being stored and trained on the platform has not changed over time or over space. 
Some other relevant dependencies are listed in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Dependencies of the Training Phase 











directly or indirectly 
involved in training the 
model  
Third party platforms 





Testing of a machine learning model often involves the same platform, tools, and 
software as the training phase, so the dependencies do not vary much; however, training 
and testing of a model are often done in many iterations (epochs). Because of these 
iterations, it is important before moving into the testing phase to have another security 
control as an extra layer of protection. At a minimum this control point should verify that 
the model at the end of the training phases is the same model being used at the beginning 
of the testing phase. Possible testing dependencies are seen in Table 3.  
Table 3. Dependencies in the Testing Phase 












Third party platforms 





Before transitioning to the deployment phase, we need another security control to 
verify that the model has not been tampered with. Once past this security control, the 
security implications really depend on the specific application, but adversarial examples 
are a common security concern. Deployment dependencies again are primarily concerned 
with the cloud platform.  
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Security control points are not new or complicated concepts in cybersecurity, but 
they can be very useful in catching breaches in security before they have a chance to spread 
to the rest of the supply chain. As mentioned previously, current industry best practice does 
not ensure comprehensive security of the software or machine learning supply chain [4]. 
Implementing security controls should be implemented into industry standards. Chapter IV 
describes a demonstration showing that machine learning supply chains without sufficient 
security controls are vulnerable to tampering. Additionally, Chapter IV presents 
techniques, which effectively mitigate this type of tampering.  
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IV. DEMONSTRATING SUPPLY CHAIN RISKS AND 
MITIGATIONS 
We provide an experimental demonstration of one of the vulnerabilities of a 
machine learning application to a supply chain attack, in order to validate the risks 
described in Chapter III. We also demonstrate how to mitigate a class of supply chain 
attacks that include our demonstration attack. Our goal is not to create a new type of supply 
chain attack or a new defense technique, but to validate knowledge of the risks and controls 
in an exemplary setting analogous to commonly encountered supply-chain conditions. We 
show how implementing simple time-tested cybersecurity techniques in the form of secure 
ML training checkpoints can detect this specific attack. For clarity of this demonstration, 
we intentionally keep the machine learning application, the supply chain attack, and the 
secure checkpoint simple. 
A. SETTING AND THREAT MODEL 
In this section, we will first discuss the attack surface of our model, the selected 
threat model, and then mechanics of the attack and defense. As previously discussed, the 
attack surface of a supply chain can be very large [36]. The following discussion is not an 
exhaustive list of possible attacks on our supply chain, but a highlight of the most common 
can be seen in Figure 9. When crafting an attack on the supply chain, we can poison the 
dataset [7]. This would involve inserting several entries in the dataset with the wrong 
labels. For example, if we wanted to cause our model to misclassify all images of the 
numeral three, we could insert multiple images of the numeral three with a false label of 
another numeral into the training dataset. This could cause the model to misclassify the 
numeral three upon deployment.  
Another option would be to attack the model after it has been deployed. We could 
carefully create inputs known as adversarial examples to cause the model to misclassify an 
image. The most well-known input attack is the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). In 
this attack, the attacker creates an adversarial example by taking a gradient of the loss of 
the model with respect to the input image and adding these perturbations to the image [8]. 
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A famous example of this would be adding perturbations to the pixels in a stop sign image 
causing the model to misclassify the image.  
 
Figure 9. Model’s Attack Surface. Source: [27]. 
Both attacks are viable ways of attacking the machine learning supply chain, but 
there are many research papers on defending these types of attacks. Because we want to 
highlight machine learning’s dependency on third-party platforms, we chose to attack the 
integrity of the model by attacking the parameters. We will define and discuss our attack 
on parameters; but first we will define our threat model.  
In our threat model, our attacker is someone with white-box access, whose goal is 
to change the output of a machine learning classification system trained and stored on a 
third-party platform. The attacker has knowledge of the system’s architecture, access to the 
model, and the ability to modify the parameters of the model. We also assume the 
organization has access to secure storage outside of the third-party platform and that the 
attacker does not have access to this secure storage.  
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Let us examine our assumptions and investigate their reasonableness. Our first 
assumption is that the attacker has white-box access to our machine learning system. This 
access would require the credentials needed to access the third-party platform. The ability 
of a malicious actor to steal credentials has been demonstrated countless times and is a 
reasonable assumption [45]. The second assumption is that the attacker has knowledge of 
the system’s architecture, access to the model, and the ability to modify parameters. Our 
previous assumption involved acquiring credentials to the third-party platform. If the 
attacker has these credentials, it is a reasonable assumption that they can view, access, and 
alter the machine learning model with the stolen credentials. We also assume the 
organization has access to secure storage outside of the third-party platform and that the 
attacker does not have access to this secure storage.  This is an unorthodox assumption, but 
we believe it is reasonable. Compromising one set of credentials, does not automatically 
imply access on other systems.  
We have described our threat model. The question remains, does this threat model 
resemble any real-life attacks? The answer is yes. Here is a real-life scenario where this 
threat model would be applicable. An organization trains and host a machine learning 
application on a third-party platform. An attacker steals the credentials of an employee with 
access to the third-party platform through social engineering, brute-force attack, or some 
other means. The attacker uses these stolen credentials to log into the third-party platform, 
access, view, and alter the model. The attacker tries to access the file systems outside of 
the third party that may hold metadata of the model’s architecture, but access to these files 
requires credentials they do not hold. Each one of these actions is feasible, reasonable, and 
fits within our threat model. A representation of our threat model is shown in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10. Threat Model. Source: [27]. 
B. DEMONSTRATION ATTACK 
With our threat model defined, we can now discuss the mechanics of our attack on 
the model’s parameters. Parameter attacks are similar to input attacks on images. The key 
difference is the parameters of the model and not the pixels of the image are being altered. 
Two broad categories of parameter attacks are gradient descent-based attacks and a single-
bias attack (SBA). The gradient descent attack is similar to the FGSM attack [8]. Again, 
the key difference is the perturbations are added to the weights of the model instead of the 
pixels in the adversarial example. SBAs work very similarly to a “single-pixel” attack [46]; 
but instead of perturbing a single pixel in an input image, an SBA perturbs a single 
parameter of the model [9]. We chose to demonstrate supply chain risk using an SBA, 
because they are simpler to understand in a demonstration. Additionally, for simplicity of 
the demonstration, we limit out attack to the output layer.  
An SBA takes advantage of the fact that we can force the output of a DNN classifier 
with a ReLu like activation function to be class i by adding a sufficiently large bias to the 
ith output neuron [9]. For the bias added to the ith neuron to be sufficiently large, the DNN 
classifier’s output must converge upon the ith class [9]. 
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There are two facets to this attack: effectiveness and stealth [9]. We define the 
effectiveness of an attack to be the probability of misclassifying the target class of images. 
We also adopt the definition of [9], for stealth of our attack. We represent the effectiveness 
and stealth of our attack through a custom loss function as seen in the following equation.  
 
Now that we have a means of measuring the performance of our attack, we can 
describe the attack. The first step in the attack is determining the sink class for the bias of 
each neuron. The sink class of the bias of a neuron is the output of the DNN classifier when 
a sufficiently large bias is added to the neuron [9]. To determine which neuron is biased 
towards the sink class, we follow the steps in Equation 2. First, initialize all neurons to 0. 
Second, add a bias value to a neuron. The output of DNN classifier will be the sink class 
of the neuron with the bias value. Follow this process for every neuron to determine the 
sink class of each neuron. Because our attack is limited to the output layer, this step is 
unnecessary. A large bias added to the 0th output neuron will force output to converge on 
the class of 0, the 1st output neuron with a large bias forces the output to converge on the 




Once the sink classes have been established, the second step in the SBA is 
determining the size of a bias needed to cause the DNN classifier to converge on the 
targeted sink class [9]. This needed bias value can be obtained by the following the 





This will result in a DNN that converges on a single target class. One of the 
previously stated goals of our attack is stealth. This attack is not stealthy because it will 
result in a classifier whose output converges upon a single target class, and it more closely 
resembles a Denial of Service (DOS) attack [9], as the performance of the classifier will 
collapse to the fraction of test data in the targeted class. We want to be able to misclassify 
a target class without misclassifying the untargeted classes. In our attack, we modify the 
original SBA by formulating the related optimization problem, as seen in Equation 4.  
 
Our attack forces a DNN classifier with a ReLu like activation function to not be 
class i by subtracting a significantly large bias from the ith output neuron. For the bias 
subtracted from the ith output neuron to be sufficiently large, the DNN classifier’s output 
must diverge from the ith class. This will result in the DNN classifier not classifying the 
targeted class as the correct class without affecting the classifier’s classification of the 
untargeted classes.  
On a practical side note, mounting a successful attack does not require a precise 
bias value [9]. We simply need a bias that is large in comparison to the other output neurons 
[9]. The upper bound of L in our equation is there to help avoid anomaly detection 
techniques. In our attack we arbitrarily chose a value of 1000 as the upper limit of our bias. 
This large number would stand out as an anomaly in a visual inspection of our model’s 
weights, but it ensures in our demonstration that the bias is sufficiently large compared to 
the other output neurons.  
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C. MAINTAINING MODEL INTEGRITY 
Vulnerability to the SBA in our setting results from trust in the model’s 
dependencies, in this case the ability of the third-party platform to maintain data integrity 
against unauthorized parties. By assuming that the model on the third-party platform at any 
moment is the intended model, we become vulnerable if the model has been altered without 
our knowledge. This breach is not a result of a vulnerability of the third-party platform, but 
of the fact that integrity of the model is not assured across our supply chain. We need a 
defense that can detect when our model has been compromised as it advances through its 
life cycle. As discussed in the previous chapters, strategic use of security controls, as seen 
in Figure 11, are a way to detect and prevent the spread of compromises in the supply chain. 
 
Figure 11. Needed Checkpoint. Source: [27]  
We need a security control between life cycle phases to verify the model we are 
loading from the TensorFlow checkpoint is the model that we previously saved during 
training. There are several ways we can craft such a checkpoint. There have been multiple 
methods proposed on how to detect if a model’s parameters have been altered [12]–[14]. 
These methods work, but they are computationally expensive and needlessly complicated. 
A simpler technique would be to save the integrity metadata of the model’s parameters to 
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the assumed secure file system outside of the third-party platform upon completion of 
training and then upon future access of the model to compare the copies of the integrity 
metadata. Saving integrity data to an off-site file system does not completely mitigate the 
integrity concerns of our model. It simply moves integrity concerns to another location; 
however, it is desirable because it is an added layer of defense and verifying the integrity 
of metadata is computationally cheaper than verifying the integrity of the entire model 
through one of the previously researched techniques [12]–[14]. The proposed defense 
technique is represented in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12. Our Checkpoint. Source: [27] 
Upon accessing the saved model, we would compare the off-site saved integrity 
metadata with the integrity metadata of the model that were downloaded from the 
TensorFlow’s checkpoint saved on third-party platform. If the integrity metadata match, 
we can have more confidence that an attacker has not altered our model stored on the third-
party platform. If the integrity metadata do not match, we are alerted to the breach and can 
address the alert before proceeding to the next phase.  
This is simple and elegant. It can detect SBAs and other attacks on model 
parameters. Because our checkpoint utilizes cryptographically secure hashes and hashes 
give fixed-size outputs and cryptographically secure hash functions have preimage and 
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second preimage resistance, verification of the integrity metadata will fail in the same way 
if one parameter is changed or if every parameter of the model is changed. This mitigates 
our reliance on a third-party to maintain data integrity over time. Although this solution is 
straightforward, we have not seen it described in literature. Implementation details of the 
machine learning application, attack mechanics, and defense mechanics are discussed in 
the next subsection.  
D. IMPLEMENTATION 
The machine learning application for this experiment will be a machine learning 
model that classifies images. The workflow for this application will follow the static 
machine learning workflow, as presented in Figure 6. There are four phases: Data 
Collection, Training, Testing, and Deployment. Additionally, there are dependencies for 
each phase. 
In the data collection phase, we use the Modified National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (MNIST) database. The MNIST database is very popular for creating 
simple machine learning classification models. The database contains 60,000 training 
images and 10,000 testing images. Each image is 28 by 28 pixels and conforms to grayscale 
levels. We download the database from the built-in MNIST dataset in the TensorFlow 
Application Programming Interface (API). Examples from the dataset are provided in  
Figure 13.  
32 
 
Figure 13. MNIST Dataset Examples. Source: [44]. 
Because of the popularity of third-party software in machine learning development, 
we utilize Google’s Colab in our data collection, training, testing, and deployment phases. 
Colab is a free Jupyter notebook environment. The notebooks are stored on Google Drive, 
and they are run in the cloud. Colab supports many programming languages; but in this 
experiment, we exclusively use Python3. Additionally, we use the following libraries in 
the creation and testing of our model TensorFlow, Keras, NumPy, and OS. These libraries 
enjoy widespread popularity among machine learning developers.  
We begin by importing the necessary libraries: TensorFlow, Keras, NumPy, and 
OS.  Next, we download the MNIST dataset. Additionally, we clean and format the data 
through TensorFlow’s reshape method. We select an Adam optimizer and a ReLu 
activation function. The model is made up of four layers: input, dense layer, dropout layer, 
and another dense layer. We want to be able to access our model upon later dates, so we 
save all parameters of our model to the TensorFlow checkpoint at the end of the training 
phase. A visual representation of our workflow up to this point is depicted in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14. Model Supply Chain. Source: [27]. 
There are often multiple training and testing iterations in the creation of the model, 
so there is an added path from testing to the training phase.  
When constructing our secure checkpoint, we wrap the standard TensorFlow 
checkpoint API calls to make a new custom checkpoint. Within out custom checkpoint, we 
compute the hash of the saved model’s parameters with a SHA-256 algorithm and save it 
to the assumed secure off-site file system.  
When constructing the attack, we used two custom functions to implement 
Equations 2 and 3. The function determined the sink classes of the output neurons, and the 
second optimized our bias value. After creating the baseline model, defense technique, and 
attack, our workflow is represented by the workflow depicted in Figure 14.  
E. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Before we can examine the effectiveness of our attack or defense, we need to 
establish the baseline performance of our model. We will use overall accuracy as the 
performance metric for the base model. The accuracy was calculated by using 
TensorFlow’s predict method. The accuracy of the model with 10 epochs was 98.2%. 
With the performance of the base model established, we will first look at the 
performance of the attack and then at the performance of the defense. To test the 
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performance of our single bias attack, we ran the attack a total of 10 times, once for each 
class of images. We describe the performance of the attack in terms of a custom loss 
function, as described in Equation 1. This function has two terms: the change in accuracy 
of the model and the probability of misclassifying the selected class of images. We will 
examine each of these terms individually in Figures 15–17 before examining the overall 
loss itself in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 15. Change in Accuracy versus Target Class 
The change in accuracy of the altered models ranged from 9.0% to 11.18%. At first 
glance, this appears to be an unacceptably large degradation in the performance of the 
model; however, this large change in accuracy is a result of the relatively few output 
neurons. Looking at Figure 16, we can see that each class of images makes up 
approximately 10% of the data. If we compare the change in accuracy of the altered model 
with the percentage of the misclassified class of images, we see that they roughly 
correspond. The small difference between change in accuracy and percentage of the 





















Figure 16. Dataset Composition by Image Class (percentage) 
Next, we will look at Figure 17, which represents the probability of misclassifying 
the selected image. The baseline model had roughly a 0.2% chance of misclassifying a 
selected image, because of the inherent 98.2% accuracy of the model. For all 10 classes of 
images, the altered model had 100% probability of misclassifying the selected class of 
images.  
 
Figure 17. Probability of Misclassification versus. Target Class 
Now that we have looked at the individual parts of the loss function. We will 
examine the loss of each altered model. The best possible loss value would be 100% 
probability of misclassification and 0% degradation of model accuracy. The loss of the 






























close to the maximum possible loss value; and again, to emphasize the point of Figure 16, 
an expected loss of a well-functioning attack would approximately be 0.9, given that each 
targeted misclassified class of images was approximately 10% of the total images.  
 
Figure 18. Attack Performance Using Custom Loss versus Target Class 
These results show that our single bias attack is effective enough to be an efficient 
attack and sufficient for our demonstration purposes, but it would not be stealthy enough 
to attack a classifier with a relatively few output neurons. Next, we will examine the 
effectiveness of our proposed defense.  
After implementing our defense, we used our base-line classifier to predict the class 
of images in the test images dataset and then recorded the output of our custom checkpoint. 
Next, we used our SBA to attack an output neuron, used the altered classifier to predict the 
classes of the images in the test dataset, and then recorded the output of our custom 
checkpoint. We did this for a total of 10 attacks, once for every output neuron of our 
classifier.  Our results are seen in Figure 19. Of the 11 times our custom checkpoint was 

















Figure 19. Detection Performance 
























As stated throughout this thesis, the purpose of this research is not to demonstrate 
a new type of supply chain attack or a new defense technique. The purpose is to 
demonstrate that the machine learning supply chain is vulnerable to a specific supply chain 
attack and how security controls like our proposed secure ML checkpoint are a viable 
technique to mitigate a broad class of supply chain attack. Machine learning supply chains 
are vulnerable to supply chain attacks because of the lack of sufficient industry security 
standards and the large amount of trust put in dependencies [4]. Specifically, the 
outsourcing of the training and testing of the model to third-party platforms such as AWS 
or Colab increases the trusted computing base in an ML model. Because software supply 
chains tend to be highly co-dependent and managed in active, cyclical ways, compromises 
in any phase of the of the supply chain or in the one of the dependencies can affect the rest 
of the supply chain.  
Additionally, it is impossible to have complete trust in the security of each phase 
and dependency of the supply chain [38], [39]. Because of this inherent risk, when 
implementing security within a supply chain, we need a design with possible failure in 
mind and the ability to detect an attack. We believe that strategically placed security 
controls such as our proposed secure checkpoints can identify compromises within a phase 
or dependency before proceeding to the rest of the supply chain.   
A. CONTRIBUTION 
To examine the validity of this claim, we created our own machine learning 
application with its own supply chain. We showed how an attacker with access to the third-
party platform on which a model is developed can exploit our trust in the third-party 
platform by attacking our saved model through an SBA. We demonstrated the successful 
misclassification of an entire class of images by subtracting a large arbitrary bias from a 
targeted output neuron. We then demonstrated how to construct a secure ML checkpoint 
by extending the standard TensorFlow checkpoint API. Our secure checkpoint was 
effective at alerting us to the presence of an SBA. This check point used cryptographic 
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hashes to implement a requirement for checkable integrity metadata.  While not as 
sophisticated or complicated as some other detection methods [12]–[14], our checkpoint 
was not computationally expensive and performed with only true-positives and true-
negatives. To our knowledge, there is no mention in literature of using integrity verification 
to protect machine learning model integrity.  
While our machine learning application was trivial, it is sufficient for example 
purposes. Many machine learning applications are more complex but could be defended in 
precisely the same manner. The compromise of critical application such as facial 
recognition or image classification of weapons systems could have devastating 
consequences. Organizations need to know that the integrity of their machine learning 
model has not been compromised. We were able to demonstrate how easily a machine 
learning model can be compromised, and how such an attack can be detected. It is crucial 
to the success of an organization to implement security controls at strategic points in their 
supply chain. We hope that our research will be the catalyst for organizations to be 
proactive in their defense of the supply chain.  
B. FUTURE RESEARCH  
Our proposal for a secure checkpoint provides a reliable defense against a class of 
supply chain attacks, but it is a fairly blunt approach that could be improved with future 
research. For example, our current checkpoint simply alerts us to the presence of 
modifications our model. Our checkpoint does not allow us to see which of the output 
neurons were perturbed. Training machine learning models is expensive. It could be 
valuable if the perturbations were limited to a specific neuron, and developers were able to 
salvage the model. Finer grained constructions of the required integrity metadata, such as 
the use of Merkle trees would enable more detailed descriptions of the detected model 
perturbations to be produced efficiently (models can involve millions or billions of 
parameters, making direct comparisons inefficient or rendering saving the full model to 
secure storage impractical). 
Additionally, our proposed checkpoint usefulness is limited in scope. It works only 
on static machine learning models. Online machine learning models that are constantly 
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updating parameters with incoming feedback would not be compatible with our approach. 
A different hash would constantly be calculated with every update of the model rendering 
our checkpoint useless. Future research could develop integrity management methods 
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